This article demonstrates the ambiguity of solidarity as articulated in the European Union's 2015 relocation schemes for persons in need of international protection. These schemes are shown in turn to reflect the wider limits to solidarity when it comes to the location of people in need of protection. The article also argues that in International Relations theory, the present limits to solidarity are still often either reified or denied, which limits in turn our ability to understand the ethics of global problems and interventions. The final section of the article sketches out a via media which collapses -rather than bridges -the 'real' and the 'ideal' and which might better serve our understanding of the ethics of difficult problems like the refugee 'problem'.
INTRODUCTION
This article demonstrates the ambiguity of solidarity as articulated in the European Union's 2015 relocation schemes for persons in need of international protection. These schemes are shown in turn to reflect the wider limits to solidarity when it comes to the location of people in need of protection. The article also argues that in International Relations theory, the present limits to solidarity are still often either reified or denied, which limits in turn our ability to understand the ethics of global problems and interventions. The final section of the article sketches out a via media which collapses -rather than bridges -the 'real' and the 'ideal' and which might better serve our understanding of the ethics of difficult problems like the refugee 'problem'.
The first section sets up the article, outlining the methodological assumptions underpinning the at least able to do so without fear for life or liberty. It is for this reason that the prohibition on returning refugees -explained by a right to non-refoulement -has emerged as the cornerstone of the regime for international protection (UNHCR, 1997) . However, as Hannah Arendt recognised prior to the creation of this regime (1973: p. 278 ), this entrenches refugees as problematic in a system premised on the possibility of return, or 'deportability'.
The relationship between norm and exception, or routine and problem, when it comes to refugees has been subject to considerable discussion. In Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins' analysis, the challenge lies 'precisely in understanding how crisis and routine are articulated in practice and […] the effects of this articulation'. For them, responses to problems or 'crises' often focus 'only on patching the rupture' (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins, 2016: pp. 317-18) . Emma Haddad's observation (2003: p. 10 ) that 'some regulation of the refugee problem is necessary if it is not to totally destabilise the international system' clearly reflects the way that the refugee problem is an exception which props up the norm. In Phil Orchard's words, (2014: p. 5) refugees 'are a relief valve for the state system'. If conceived as a 'relief valve', it is clear that there have been considerable attempts in the last few decades to prevent the 'flow' iii of refugees into developed countries, with effects on the world's problem with refugees.
It follows that even the term 'refugee' must be interpreted within the context of the actors and practices partly constitutive of it. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 1977) maintains that refugee status is in fact independent of state recognition. However, the extent to which international protection rests on state willingness to shoulder responsibility for international protection complicates this claim. Without documented state recognition of refugee status, a person's very need for international protection is ambiguous, and therefore often hotly contested. Border control and control of migration have become increasingly politicised (see, e.g. Gibney, 2008 ), or even, arguably, securitised (Bigo, 2014 in recent years. The tendency of many developed states either to limit the entry of people seeking international protection in order to stay out of the problem of location, to drag out and deny the claims of those who do make it , and to resort to detention and deportation have been well-documented (on this, see, e.g., Coleman and Kocher, 2011; Gibney, 2008; Schuster, 2005) .
To be clear, positioning refugees as a problem itself raises a range of questions that need addressing. First, is the issue of whether this risks reifying not only the general term 'problem', but also the 'refugee problem', and even the term 'refugee' (Crawley and Skleparis, 2017) . The approach taken in this article sets out to explicitly avoid this issue in its assumptions regarding the contingent and constitutive aspects of problems. A further consideration when talking of a refugee problem relates to the chosen case study. Given the focus on Europe, talk of a problem risks exaggeration insofar as only a very small percentage of those fleeing conflict or persecution leave their own country, let alone make the long journey to Europe. For this reason, many scholars of migration dispute the often-used term, 'crisis' (e.g. Crawley and Skleparis, 2017; Gilbert, 2015; Ibrahim and Howarth, 2017; Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins, 2016 ).
Geoff Gilbert contends that 'Europe does not have a refugee crisis', for reasons related to the number of arrivals relative to the resources available, the policy construction of existing issues, and the reality that any response will need to be global rather than just European' (Gilbert, 2015) . Others claim that a narrative of crisis 'has been used to justify policies of exclusion and containment' (Crawley and Skleparis, 2017: p. 1). Crisis narratives serve to 'Other' people on the move (Ibrahim and Howarth, 2017) , and -as work in Critical Security Studies (e.g. Bigo, 2014) has shown -to 'produce collective indifference' (Basaran, 2015: p. 205) . The articulation of a distinctly European crisis has also been shown to reproduce a 'linear' conception of migration, and a binary between Europe and 'outside' which obscures 'the complex economic, social and political realities of the "in between"' (Crawley and Skleparis,
2017: p. 2).
Even so, the construction of these people as a problem in need of solution is revealing of the way that responsibility, solidarity and location are conceived by the EU in relation to people who have first re-located themselves a considerable distance from their country of origin.
Therefore, mindful of the relationship between 'problem' and solution; the legal and political context of location and relocation both globally and within the European Union; and the specific framings of problem, solution, responsibility and solidarity, the conclusion to this article sketches a theoretical paradigm for re-imagining solidarity in world politics.
EUROPE'S PROBLEM WITH REFUGEES
The case study of European Union (EU) relocation policy examined in this section was selected in part because of the central importance of location to people unable to return to their own country without fearing for their life and liberty. EU policy here is also of interest because of ambiguities, which I will shortly outline, in relation to its contentious status and (at the time of writing) mixed success in implementation. As the first section of the article explained, this article is interested in the way that relevant actors implicate themselves in problems in their responses to phenomena such as the irregular arrival of large numbers of people. As it will show, the concepts of responsibility and solidarity do considerable work in the EU's relocation response, and hence in the framing of the refugee problem. Of course, responsibility, and -to a lesser extent -solidarity are key concepts in political and international theory. However, their contingent and constitutive character in the EU case study here examined stand in contrast to more abstract conceptions. Even so, it is useful to have in mind a general and provisional understanding of both terms. Taking just a dictionary definition as a starting point, responsibility entails the liability in some sense of a specific cause or actor, whereas solidarity generally implies some unity of interest, objective, or -perhaps -liability.
In the context of international protection, responsibility is very clearly defined. "Dublin III" (European Union, 2013) enshrines the responsibility of the first safe country of asylum for refugee status determination. It requires states such as Italy and Greece to examine asylum claims, to receive back people who breach the regulation by engaging in secondary migration, iv and to support the EU in removing failed asylum seekers from Union territory:
Although a mechanism directly concerned with the allocation of responsibility amongst EU states according to specific criteria laid therein, the Dublin system […] was not, since its conception, intended to be a mechanism for equitably sharing responsibilities with regards to the examination of asylum claims. Its very foundation counteracts solidarity, primarily in the interstate dimension, as it shifts responsibility for the examination of asylum claims to front-line Member States (Karageorgiou, 2016: p. 205 ).
The shifting of responsibility to front-line states has been further supported through 'careful use of visa requirements and carrier sanctions to ensure the arrival of asylum applicants by land' (Guild, 2006: p. 637 ), or sea, rather than air. Today, the continued legitimacy of Dublin is up for debate within the EU. In September 2015, the European Parliament (2015a) lamented that Dublin's 'negative impact […] regrettably has not yet led to the suspension of that regulation or at least the removal of the reference to the first country of entry into the Union'.
The European Commission's (2015) evaluation of the Dublin III regulation is a wide-ranging analysis, which argues in conclusion that Dublin is valuable in part because it prevents member states from disputing 'who should take responsibility'.
As might be expected, there is a significant literature which theorises the extent to which the EU is based on, or produces, solidarity in this general sense. Andrew Moravcsik's (1998) theory of 'liberal intergovernmentalism' has been particularly influential. I do not intend to address this work here, except to note its support for other theories which identify continuing dis-unity in interests of international actors on issues of 'high politics' (e.g. Boudreau et al, 2010) . On refugees specifically, the weakness of burden sharing norms has been subject to much discussion (Betts, 2009) . In recent years, the relationship between the EU's responses to refugees and the Union's 'crisis of solidarity' have also been debated (Ibrahim and Howarth, 2017: p. 7).
In considering Europe's problem with refugees, the principle of subsidiarity, outlined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), is significant. The principle states that in areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union will only act: In its statement, the Czech Republic claimed that the 'proposed relocation scheme will never be functional', in large part because of its intention to 'handle refugees as mere objects, which can be moved around' ( As of July 2017, 24,676 people (of the 98,255 which excludes the 54,000 reallocated to resettlement from Turkey) had been relocated (European Commission, 2017b) . This represent a notable increase in the pace of relocations. According to the European Commission (2017: p. 2), this: contingency on the willingness and ability of the states with primary responsibility to receive, identify, and process arrivals efficiently. However, the European Parliament has pushed for a version of solidarity that sees responsibility as collective, or shared. The decision to annex the allocation to the second decision, and an as yet unapproved proposal by the President of the European for a permanent crisis relocation scheme (Juncker, 2015) also reflect a tension between a voluntary and more binding conception of solidarity, which future research should revisit.
A key constitutive effect of the two Decisions under consideration has been the attempt to shore up the ailing Dublin system. The EU's conception of solidarity taken overall remains in tension with responsibility, and hence with routine practice. The temporary exceptional measures provided for in the EU's 2015 relocation measures represent just the kind of relief valve discussed earlier for the routine arrangements of the common EU asylum system. The concept of solidarity as framed in Europe's problem with refugees is clearly of the kind 'through which social and political orders are stabilised and reproduced' (Weber, 2017: p. 693 ). This is evident in the fact that solidarity is framed by the EU's most powerful actors (states and the Council of the EU) as a relationship between member states or an unusual and unified response, rather than as a relationship between EU actors and refugees. While it is not possible to generalise from a single case, there is ample evidence that it is not only Europe that frames solidarity as contingent on other actors' responsibility for refugees. x A question remains, however, as to whether imagining alternative futures is feasible given the current limits to solidarity.
THE PROBLEM WITH SOLIDARITY: REFUGEES IN WORLD POLITICS
Having outlined the vital importance of location to refugee protection, and examined the recent EU attempt to relocate up to 160,000 people recognised as being in need of this protection, the article now considers alternative ways of conceiving of responsibility and solidarity in thinking about the world's problem with refugees. Here, I sketch a heuristic of three kinds of answer:
real, ideal, and via media, and again examine the constitutive role of responsibility and solidarity in the framing of problem and solution. I argue in the conclusion to this section for the merits of approaches that chart the (admittedly unsteady) course between realism and utopianism in trying to imagine solidarity in response to refugees.
In the literature on global problems, a line can generally be drawn between those theories premised on realist assumptions, and those founded on utopianism. I continue here to address the relationship between problems and solutions; in Nigel Dower's (2010: p. 174) account of 'what makes a problem global', he suggests that problems can be global if they require 'actions by many actors all over the world'. The centrality of human location both to states (which are premised on having a permanent population and which seek in various ways to limit this population), and to refugees (unwilling or unable to return to their own country without fear for life or liberty) suggests that the location of refugees is indeed a global problem. Similarly, the willingness of EU actors (and a range of other states and institutions) to implicate other actors as responsible suggests that the world as a whole has a problem with refugees. As noted in the first section of this article, responding to refugees inevitably entails framing the refugee problem. The claim that problems and solutions are co-constitutive bears repeating in considering the ethics of the refugee problem, and the scope of solidarity. The articulation of realistic, utopian, or via media ethics in response will be contingent on the way the research 'problem' is framed. Laura Valentini (2017: p. 662) suggests that 'there is no right answer to the question of whether normative political theorising should be 'ideal' or 'non-ideal' (meaning more-or-less realistic)'. Rather, this will depend 'on the particular question the theory itself is meant to answer'. While the focus in the previous section was broadly, empirical, this section addresses a separate (but related) question. Here I ask how solidarity might be re-imagined.
One approach to theorising the current relocation problem which leaves millions of people stuck in a 'middle space between flight and solution' (Aleinikoff, 2015) is found in theories which take for granted the structural constraints associated with the state system. The 'realistic' paradigm includes, but is not limited to, the kind of structural realist international relations theory commonly associated with Kenneth Waltz (1979) . We can also include others sceptical about the scope for distributing responsibility in global politics, particularly when it comes to the richest and most powerful states. In Robert Keohane's words, it is naïve to believe that the United States, for example 'will be easy to hold externally accountable ' (2003: p. 152 ). Moreor-less 'realistic' theories tend to assume that states will avoid taking responsibility for global problems, especially when there is a sovereign interest at stake, as there is on questions of human relocation. The answer of these types of theory to my current question is likely to be that the real world is constitutive of substantial limits to solidarity.
In the interests of resisting 'the path of least ethical resistance toward fatalism, dogmatism, and cynicism' (Der Derian, 1995: p. 5), however, let us turn to the utopian paradigm. Dower's (2010: p. 174) account of global problems, as ones requiring coordination action, is said to presuppose a global ethics in which 'human suffering anywhere is regarded as bad' and 'we have a duty to cooperate'. The claims that human suffering anywhere is bad, and that this creates a duty, are moral claims, abstracted from the state system in which solidarity is more ambiguous. These claims, for Dower (2010: pp. 180-1), are part of an 'ethics of globalization', which presumes that our responses to global problems can impact on the world as it is currently ordered. Dower (2010: p. 181 ) is interested in how we get from 'a global ethics in principle to a global ethics in practice'. This presumes that principle is -or at least can be -pre-practice, and hence pre-political. For him, ethics has to be abstracted from the particularism of existing practice if the goal is to transcend that particularism (Dower, 2010: p. 181) . Similarly, David Miller (2001: p. 454) claims that:
The problem is to find a principle, or set of principles, for assigning such responsibilities which carries moral weight, so that we can say that agents who fail to discharge their remedial responsibilities act wrongly and may properly be sanctioned'.
Leaving to one side the question of how we 'find' these principles, Miller (2001: p. 454 ) here fails to specify the 'we', and elides the space between saying and sanctioning. In fairness,
Miller fully acknowledges that 'very often, [… a] problem arises precisely because of the lack of any institutional mechanism that can assign responsibilities'. xi He contends, on that basis, that 'meanwhile, the best we can do is to lay out some principles for distributing responsibilities that we hope will command widespread agreement'.
This approach to ethics is shared by scholars writing on the specific problem of refugee (re-)location. Nils Holtug (2017: p. 279) , for example, grounds his fair distribution theory, and his arguments about how the EU 'should' respond to the refugee 'crisis' in moral claims about the obligation of states to admit refugees. He also considers 'whether other states are required to pick up the slack if some refuse to admit their fair share' (Holtug, 2017: p. 279) . Given the approach to conceptualising problems outlined in the first section of the current article, my own distance from this mode of theorising may be obvious. In our world, responses to problems are, inevitably, both constraining (in their connection to the framing of the problem at hand) and constrained. In what remains of the article, I therefore provide an alternative way of thinking about relocation as a global problem, and of conceptualising responsibility and solidarity in response.
Solidarity and the social
The question of how to conceive of solidarity, both within and beyond existing political communities, remains a subject of vigorous and continuing debate (e.g. Banting and Kymlicka, There is a long tradition in IR theory of trying to chart a middle way or compromise between revolutionary and realist paradigms, ranging from constructivist and English School perspectives to post-structuralism. However, as noted in the first part of this article, problems and solutions are always mutually implicated. For that reason, it is unproductive to see the task as one of clearing a path or building a bridge between the real and the ideal. In the words of Kimberly Hutchings (1999: p. 62) , accepting this is to acknowledge that when we look closely, 'reality and ideality are always already indistinguishable'. Even so, there remains a marked tendency for work in global ethics theorising the relationship between real and ideal to assume or reproduce an a priori separation between the two (Hutchings, 1999: p. 62) . The task of an alternative via media approach is not to clear a path, nor build a bridge, but to contract the space between real and ideal in order to examine the social space co-constitutive of both (see also Barder and Levine, 2012) .
This line of thinking is in tune with Andrew Linklater's criticisms of English School theories in which 'the issue was how 'solidarist' principles could be embedded within global arrangements that are 'pluralist' at core' (Linklater, 2011 (Linklater, : p. 1179 ; see also Weber, 2017) . Very recently, scholarship in IR theory -including the articles in the present issue -are again attempting to understand the complex relationships between problems and solutions, the real and the ideal. In a recent volume on the future of human rights and the so-called international 'responsibility to protect', a range of IR scholars address the future of human rights, seeking to avoid both fatalism and denial (Hehir, 2017) . This kind of theorising is inescapably messy, and poses difficult questions regarding future prospects in the absence of artificially clear pathways or bridges. If the founding assumption is not separation, but is rather indistinguishability, then the space between the present and the future is contracted. While this doesn't provide any straightforward answers, it outlines the complex social space in which solidarity might be re-imagined.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have demonstrated the ambiguity of solidarity as articulated in the EU's response to its refugee 'problem'. The EU's recent relocation schemes demonstrate the world's big problem with relocation, particularly where an expectation of international protection arises. In scholarly responses to the refugee problem, the refugee 'problem' is still often either denied in the articulation of abstract principles, or reified through a 'realistic' or fatalistic approach to world politics. The alternative set out here is a via media which collapses the real and ideal in acknowledgement of their co-constitution. The specific questions of how and whether the relationship between solidarity might extend, rather than limit, responsibility, and re-frame the problem of relocation cannot be answered here. Instead, those interested in solidarity will need to continue to examine case studies of responses, through which 'global assumptions, relationships, and responsibilities are negotiated, solidified and questioned' (Smirl, 2008: p. 236) . Without looking to the social (and conceptual) space in which specific actors frame their problems with -and responses to -refugees and others in need of international protection, the limits to solidarity will likely be reified or overlooked.
